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185433

(2016) Early analytic philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer.

The place of vagueness in Russell's philosophical development

James Levine

pp. 161-212

I distinguish three periods in Russell's philosophical development: the Moorean period, following his break with Idealism around 1899 through his attending the Paris conference in August 1900 at which he saw Peano; the period following the Paris conference through his prison stay in 1918; and his post-prison period, in which he becomes concerned with the nature of language as such. I argue that while the topic of vagueness becomes an explicit theme in his post-1918 writings, his view that ordinary language is vague plays a central role in his post-Peano practice and characterization of analysis. On the Moorean view, analysis is intended to make explicit what is already "present to the mind" of anyone who understands the relevant sentence prior to analysis; post-Peano and pre-prison, Russell presents analysis as making precise what was previously vague; post-prison, he denies that any language is precise, so that analysis involves a transition only from the more to the less vague. I argue that the failure to recognize the character of Russell's post-Peano conception of analysis reflects a broader misunderstanding of the character of Russell's philosophy and of his place in the history of analytic philosophy.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-24214-9_7

Full citation:

Levine, J. (2016)., The place of vagueness in Russell's philosophical development, in S. Costreie (ed.), Early analytic philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 161-212.

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