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(2016) Early analytic philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer.
Why did Weyl think that Dedekind's norm of belief in mathematics is perverse?
Iulian Toader
pp. 445-451
This paper discusses an intriguing, though rather overlooked case of normative disagreement in the history of philosophy of mathematics: Weyl's criticism of Dedekind's famous principle that "In science, what is provable ought not to be believed without proof." This criticism, as I see it, challenges not only a logicist norm of belief in mathematics, but also a realist view about whether there is a fact of the matter as to what norms of belief are correct.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-24214-9_19
Full citation:
Toader, I. (2016)., Why did Weyl think that Dedekind's norm of belief in mathematics is perverse?, in S. Costreie (ed.), Early analytic philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 445-451.
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