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(2017) Rethinking knowledge, Dordrecht, Springer.
Since antiquity, several philosophers and scientists have claimed that the aim of science is truth. This raises the question: What is truth? A popular answer is that a proposition is true if it corresponds to the facts to which it refers. This is the concept of truth as correspondence. However, the concept of truth as correspondence does not provide a criterion of truth, namely a way to distinguish, among all propositions, those that are true from those that are false. This chapter argues that, in fact, no criterion of truth is possible, for any concept of truth. Thus, if the aim of science is truth, then the aim of science is unreachable, since we will generally be unable to recognize a truth when we reach one. In addition to truth as correspondence, the chapter also considers some alternative concepts of truth, namely truth as consistency, truth as systematic coherence, truth as satisfiability, and truth as provability, and finds all of them wanting.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-53237-0_8
Full citation:
Cellucci, C. (2017). Knowledge and truth, in Rethinking knowledge, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 93-106.
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