The fundamental ontological interpretation of the original essence of revelation as affectivity
The conditions for manifestation in general and, first of all, for the manifestation of a being have been shown. A being, as we have seen, does not manifest itself, its encounter can take place only within a horizon which itself must present itself in the form of an effective phenomenological "offering". Insofar as a being manifests itself, it is capable of affecting us. "All affection," says Heidegger, "is a manifestation by which a being already on hand gives notice of itself."1 Insofar as the manifestation of a being implies the manifestation of the horizon, every affection by it, every ontic affection presupposes an ontological affection and finds in it its foundation. This is why the concept of affection must be drawn forth from the uncertainty where philosophy too often leaves it. What we  call an affection, the immediate arising of a datum and more specifically its passive pre-giveness, such as takes place prior to every operation of knowledge, to every activity to grasp it explicitly or spontaneously, is not simple; it is not something original if, as is usually the case, we reduce it to that which in it excites us or affects us.
Henry, M. (1973). The fundamental ontological interpretation of the original essence of revelation as affectivity, in The essence of manifestation, Den Haag, Nijhoff, pp. 457-685.
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