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(1992) Nature, cognition and system II, Dordrecht, Springer.

Can quantum computation provide a physically realistic model of the self and its brain?

Peter J. Marcer

pp. 283-295

Support is provided from the theory of Lie computability and machines for Sir John Eccles hypothesis based on extensive neurophysiological evidence, that, "Mental events (may) cause neural events analogously to the probability fields of quantum mechanics' (1).It is postulated that Lie computability, defining a model of quantum perception and cognition, provides a more appropriate insight into the working of intelligent and cybernetic machines, while establishing a possible proper scientific basis for the nature and mechanism of mental processes where these might ultimately concern non-material physical fields, i.e. those of entropy, and quantum probability and potential.The brain is the most marvellous of machines. To paraphrase Mishkin and Appenzeller (2). The most sophisticated and powerful computerlike processing unit on Earth, it incorporates a system of memory powerful enough to capture the animated image of a face in a single encounter, ample enough to accommodate the experiences and actions of a lifetime, and so versatile that the memory of a scene can summon associated recollections of sight, sounds, smells, tastes, tactile sensations and emotions, so eliciting response and reaction from the whole range of human abilities, intelligence and creativity. To think of it therefore as a purely digital architecture is too confining and yet its very existence and its workings must be explainable in scientific terms in accordance with physical laws. This is an attempt to provide such an explanation in accord with the experimentally validated evidence.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-2779-0_16

Full citation:

Marcer, P. J. (1992)., Can quantum computation provide a physically realistic model of the self and its brain?, in M. E. Carvallo (ed.), Nature, cognition and system II, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 283-295.

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