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189658

(1974) General theory of knowledge, Dordrecht, Springer.

The subjectivity of the sense qualities

Moritz Schlick

pp. 264-272

In order to find out which properties may and which may not be ascribed to things-in-themselves, we must refer back to those considerations that led us to assume that things-in-themselves do exist. For, according to what was said in § 27, the grounds for this assumption already contain the grounds for any determination or definition of such things.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-7091-3099-5_30

Full citation:

Schlick, M. (1974). The subjectivity of the sense qualities, in General theory of knowledge, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 264-272.

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