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(2017) Innovations in the history of analytical philosophy, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
Brentano's concept of mind
underlying nature, reference-fixing, and the mark of the mental
Uriah Kriegel
pp. 197-228
Perhaps the philosophical thesis most commonly associated with Brentano is that intentionality is the mark of the mental. But in fact Brentano often and centrally uses also what he calls "inner perception" to demarcate the mental. In this chapter, I offer a new interpretation of Brentano's conception of the interrelations among mentality, intentionality, and inner perception. According to this interpretation, Brentano took the concept of mind to be a natural-kind concept, with intentionality constituting the underlying nature of the mental and inner-perceivability serving as the concept's reference-fixer.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1057/978-1-137-40808-2_7
Full citation:
Kriegel, U. (2017)., Brentano's concept of mind: underlying nature, reference-fixing, and the mark of the mental, in S. Lapointe & C. Pincock (eds.), Innovations in the history of analytical philosophy, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 197-228.
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