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We can now begin to see what, given the various types of (real) Physical Border between us, it would mean to say that you and I are the same person. Recall John Locke's distinction, which he illustrates with his prince/cobbler example,1 between the identity of a man (i.e., of a human being, an animal) and the identity of a person. A particular human being's identity involves, according to Locke, the identity of an animal; a particular person's identity does not. Thus, the particular human being that gets the conscious memories of the prince is according to Locke the same person, but not the same human being, as the prince. In other words, Locke would agree that the physical borders individuating one particular human being from another do not themselves signify the metaphysical boundaries (the identities) of persons; that is, without specifying what a person is, we can with Locke claim that the individuation of physical bodies is not metaphysically equivalent to the individuation of persons (without thereby necessarily accepting Locke's positive thesis). Thus we can say without absurdity that even though I, a person, from my present point of view exist within the borders of this physical organism which I call, "my body," I am not necessarily bound by these borders because it is not contradictory to hold that a person is a physical human body and yet is not identical to a physical body.

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-3014-7_5

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