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(1995) To know or not to know, Dordrecht, Springer.

The normative constraint

Jan Srzednicki

pp. 167-187

Up to now we have been concerned with the following: firstly, and traditionally with the basic nature of the world, and things in the world that constitute what the knower attempts to know, understand, and work out (the Factual Situation). We tried to determine what that needs to be if it is to be knowable. Secondly we were concerned with the relation between the putative knower, and the object of that knower's supposed knowledge. We were investigating epistemic requirements (Epistemic System), and analyzed conditions and pre-conditions of articulation, for these are the conditions, and pre-conditions of knowing. Further, and in very general terms we inquired into the nature of the knower (Ego Sapiens), being mainly concerned with the independence of the knower and the knower's difference from the I-perspective, which the knower adopts. We now need to make a further inquiry, especially into Ego Sapiens, for clearly that Ego must possess appropriate capacities much in the way in which the world needs some features to be knowable. A stone is not a possible knower. Knowledge is possible just when the features of the world resonate to the capacities of the Ego. This then is the task of the present chapter, and finale of the book.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-3542-1_8

Full citation:

Srzednicki, J. (1995). The normative constraint, in To know or not to know, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 167-187.

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