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195106

(1985) Annals of theoretical psychology, Dordrecht, Springer.

The place of theory in a world of facts

Hans J. Eysenck

pp. 17-72

When it is frequently said, following Kuhn, that social science in general, and psychology in particular, is in a preparadigmatic phase, this may be interpreted to mean that there are no widely accepted general theories covering important areas. Psychology and other social sciences appear to suffer from the added disadvantage that not only are such theories and paradigms lacking, but professional members of these groups often regard this lack of theory as a virtue and proclaim a lack of interest in theories in general, adopting a low-level sort of empirical pragmatism.This paper argues for the vital importance of theory in psychology and gives a number of examples to demonstrate the empirical value of such theories in gaining new and better knowledge. To quote Lewin's famous saying: "There is nothing more practical than a good theory" This is extended to empirical research as well as to practical application, and it is suggested that psychology should be more interested in theories, generate theories more readily, and come to grips with the general importance of theories in scientific work. Only in this way, it is suggested, can psychology join the ranks of the properly accredited sciences and take its rightful place.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4613-2487-4_2

Full citation:

Eysenck, H. J. (1985)., The place of theory in a world of facts, in L. Mos (ed.), Annals of theoretical psychology, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 17-72.

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