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(2009) Rethinking Popper, Dordrecht, Springer.
Are perceptual experiences reasons for perceptual beliefs? The act/ content ambiguity of the term "belief" carries over to this question. I argue, following Popper, that experiences are reasons as well as causes for belief-acts, but not for belief-contents. This involves rejecting justificationism, the mistaken view that a reason for a belief-act must be a reason for its content. Popper's many critics presuppose justificationism, and so miss the main point of his solution to the problem of the empirical basis of science.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-9338-8_1
Full citation:
Musgrave, A. (2009)., Experience and perceptual belief, in Z. Parusniková & R. S. Cohen (eds.), Rethinking Popper, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 5-19.
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