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Do computer simulations advance our knowledge and if so, how? This paper approaches these questions by drawing on distinctions and insights from the philosophical study of knowledge. I focus on propositional knowledge obtained by simulations and address two key issues: How do computer simulations give rise to propositional content? And how can we be justified in believing the corresponding propositions? To answer these questions, I describe schematically how propositional content may be constructed from the inputs and outputs of computer simulations. I further argue that this propositional content has an inferential justification. I provide the premises and the conclusion of the inference. But in the end, this inference proves insufficient for knowledge from computer simulation. What is needed too is that there are reasons to believe that the right sort of inference is carried out. This is compatible with a variety of internalism regarding justification and also makes sense of the practice of verification.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-55762-5_11

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