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(2016) Readings in formal epistemology, Dordrecht, Springer.
Game theoretic reasoning has been widely applied in economics in recent years. Undoubtedly, the most commonly used tool has been the strategic equilibrium of Nash (Ann Math 54:286–295, 1951), or one or another of its so-called "refinements." Though much effort has gone into developing these refinements, relatively little attention has been paid to a more basic question: Why consider Nash equilibrium in the first place?
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_41
Full citation:
Aumann, R. (2016)., Epistemic conditions for nash equilibrium, in H. Arló-Costa, V. F. Hendricks & J. Van Benthem (eds.), Readings in formal epistemology, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 863-894.