212268

Springer, Dordrecht

2018

220 pages

ISBN 978-3-030-02217-4

Synthese Library
vol. 402

An epistemic foundation for scientific realism

defending realism without inference to the best explanation

John Wright

This monograph develops a new way of justifying the claims made by science about phenomenon not directly observable by humans, such as atoms and black holes. It details a way of making inferences to the existence and properties of unobservable entities and states of affairs that can be given a probabilistic justification. The inferences used to establish realist claims are not a form of, and neither do they rely on, inference to the best explanation.

The final chapters apply the developedconceptual apparatus to key cases from the history of science and from recent science. One example concerns realism with respect to atoms. Another looks at inferences from recent astronomical data to conclusions about the size and shape of those parts of the universe lying beyond that which we can observe.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-02218-1

Full citation [Harvard style]:

Wright, J. (2018). An epistemic foundation for scientific realism: defending realism without inference to the best explanation, Springer, Dordrecht.

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