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The inferences that never were

Peirce, perception, and Bernstein's the pragmatic turn

Richard Kenneth Atkins

pp. 55-70

In the first chapter of his book The Pragmatic Turn, Richard Bernstein has two aims. First, he aims to show that Charles Sanders Peirce is the founder of pragmatism not merely for his statement of the pragmatic maxim but for his criticisms of René Descartes. Second, he aims to apply Peirce's insights to a contemporary issue in the philosophy of percep- tion. I shall comment on Bernstein's success with respect to both aims.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1057/9781137352705_4

Full citation:

Atkins, R. (2014)., The inferences that never were: Peirce, perception, and Bernstein's the pragmatic turn, in J. M. Green (ed.), Richard J. Bernstein and the pragmatist turn in contemporary philosophy, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 55-70.

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