Repository | Journal | Volume | Articles

In a recent set of publications Ballantyne (Can J Philos 41(4):485–503, 2011, Synthese 185(3):319–334, 2012, Synthese 91(7):1391–1407, 2013) argues that luck does not have a significant role in understanding the concept of knowledge. The problem, Ballantyne argues, lies in what is commonly thought to be a necessary condition for luck—a significance or value condition (Pritchard, in Epistemic luck, 2005; Coffman, in Synthese 15(3):385–398, 2007; Lackey, in Austral J Philos 86(2):255–267, 2008, Ballantyne, in Can J Philos 41(4):485–503, 2011). For an event, like forming a true belief, to be lucky then it must be of some significance or value to an agent. Yet, if significance, as it has also been commonly thought, plays a role in determining the degree of luck (Pritchard and Smith, in New Ideas Psychol 22:1–28, 2004; Ballantyne, in Can J Philos 41(4):485–503, 2011), then this leads to a result similar to (but not the same as) an absurd form of pragmatic encroachment. If this problem cannot be avoided, then anti-luck epistemology should be abandoned. However, this paper will argue that with proper considerations about the nature of luck according to at least one theory, no such problem arises.

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0794-1

Full citation: