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(2011) Synthese 181 (1).
I examine Reichenbach’s theory of relative a priori and Michael Friedman’s interpretation of it. I argue that Reichenbach’s view remains at bottom conventionalist and that one issue which separates Reichenbach’s account from Kant’s apriorism is the problem of mathematical applicability. I then discuss Hermann Weyl’s theory of blank forms which in many ways runs parallel to the theory of relative a priori. I argue that it is capable of dealing with the problem of applicability, but with a cost.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-009-9591-z
Full citation:
Berkovski, S. (2011). Reichenbach and Weyl on apriority and mathematical applicability. Synthese 181 (1), pp. 63-77.
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