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(2008) Synthese 161 (2).
Reasons, rational requirements, and the putative pseudo-question "why be moral?"
John J. Tilley
pp. 309-323
In this paper, I challenge a well-known argument for the view that “Why be moral?” is a pseudo-question. I do so by refuting a component of that argument, a component that is not only crucial to the argument but important in its own right. That component concerns the status of moral reasons in replies to “Why be moral?”; consequently, this paper concerns reasons and rationality no less than it concerns morality. The work I devote to those topics shows not only that the argument I address is unsound, but that the conclusion of that argument is false. “Why be moral?” is no pseudo-question.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-007-9164-y
Full citation:
Tilley, J. J. (2008). Reasons, rational requirements, and the putative pseudo-question "why be moral?". Synthese 161 (2), pp. 309-323.
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