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(2006) Synthese 148 (2).
The notion of a severe test has played an important methodological role in the history of science. But it has not until recently been analyzed in any detail. We develop a generally Bayesian analysis of the notion, compare it with Deborah Mayo’s error-statistical approach by way of sample diagnostic tests in the medical sciences, and consider various objections to both. At the core of our analysis is a distinction between evidence and confirmation or belief. These notions must be kept separate if mistakes are to be avoided; combined in the right way, they provide an adequate understanding of severity.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-004-6222-6
Full citation:
Bandyopadhyay, P. S. , Brittan, G. (2006). Acceptibility, evidence, and severity. Synthese 148 (2), pp. 259-293.
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