Feeling as the origin of value in Scheler and Mencius

Nam-In Lee

pp. 141-155

Max Scheler (1874–1928) and Mencius (孟子, 372–289 BC) both take feeling to be the origin of value and could therefore be considered to be proponents of axiological sentimentalism. Despite the great spatial and temporal distance between them, there are striking similarities between the theories of value they developed. It should be noted, however, that there are also some differences between them that are mainly derived from some difficulties with their theories of value. These difficulties should be removed so that a better theory of value could be developed. It is accordingly the aim of this paper to promote a phenomenological dialogue between Scheler and Mencius that could lead to such a better theory. In Sects. 1, 2, I will first delineate Scheler’s theory of value and feeling, then that of Mencius. In Sect. 3, I will point out some difficulties with the two theories and promote a dialogue between them that would improve each theory. In Sect. 4, I will conclude with some remarks concerning the future task of the phenomenological dialogue between Scheler and Mencius.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s11007-020-09496-8

Full citation:

Lee, N.-I. (2020). Feeling as the origin of value in Scheler and Mencius. Continental Philosophy Review 53 (2), pp. 141-155.

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