Repository | Book | Chapter
(2019) First philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer.
On the theory of the theoretical attitude of the phenomenologist
what the epoché means and accomplishes
Edmund Husserl
pp. 296-315
Before I can further elucidate this disinterestedness, I have to first elucidate the more general phenomenon, which perhaps accompanies a splitting of the I, that of the ambiguity in belief and more generally in position-taking comportment, according to which, unlike the usual case, the reflecting I does not participate in the positiontaking of the lower I (indeed, even perhaps rejects it), at which it has directed itself in reflection.1 An example for this is the class="EmphasisTypeItalic ">Skeptic, who actively lives through his perceptual belief in a straightforward perspective on his | external world of perception in the harmony of his perceiving and cannot but, as a concordantly perceiving I, have these things and this world given as reality.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-024-1597-1_17
Full citation:
Husserl, E. (2019). On the theory of the theoretical attitude of the phenomenologist: what the epoché means and accomplishes, in First philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 296-315.
This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.