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(2003) Salomon Maimon: rational dogmatist, empirical skeptic, Dordrecht, Springer.
Maimon's "quid facti" argument is traditionally regarded as his most serious objection to Kant's transcendental philosophy, its conclusion being that Kant's theory of experience is inadvertently compatible with Hume's skepticism. He esteems Kant's painstaking analysis of the concept of experience as one of the supreme achievements of the human mind, comparable to Euclid's.1 Nevertheless, Kant's resp
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-2936-9_8
Full citation:
Senderowicz, Y. (2003)., Maimon's "quid facti" argument, in G. Freudenthal (ed.), Salomon Maimon: rational dogmatist, empirical skeptic, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 176-199.
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